IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR

THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE

 

In re:

 

Team Systems International, LLC,

 

Debtor.

Chapter 7

 

Case No. 22-10066 (CTG)

RANDY MOTT, pro se

 

Appellant,

-against-

 

GEORGE L. MILLER, solely in his capacity as the Chapter 7 Trustee of the estate of Team Systems International, LLC, GPDEV LLC, and Simons Exploration, Inc.(creditors)

 

Defendants.

 

 

 

 

 

 

Civ. No. 24-1035 GBW

 

                                     APPELLANT’S BRIEF

 

RANDY MOTT, ESQ. pro se

Randy Mott, Esq. DC Bar 211037

1627 K St. N.W. Suite 400

Washington, DC 20006

Phone: 202-470-0106 / 703-258-4097

randymott@rmottlaw.com

(Admitted pro hac vice)

 

 

 

 

 

 

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES……………………………………………………….i

STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW ...............................v

 

STATEMENT OF FACTS ...................................................................................... 1

 

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ..............................................................................12

 

ARGUMENT

 

I.                   The Bankruptcy Court Erred In Finding “Bad Faith”

Required Under Section 1927…………………………………………..13

 

II.                The Evidence That Was Fraudulent Was Correctly

Challenged And Should Have Been Excluded………………..………...18

 

III.             The Bankruptcy Erred In Using Evidence From Outside

the Proceeding……...………………………………………………...…20

 

IV.            The Bankruptcy Court Erred In Imposing Punitive

Sanctions Unrelated To Any Multiplication Of

Proceedings, Solely Intended To Silence Counsel……………………...22

 

CONCLUSION…………………………………………………………………...24

 

Table of Authorities

 

Cases                                                                                                                 Pages

 

ADP, LLC v. Uniloc USA Inc.

2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104953 (E.D. Tex. 2020) …………………….……………22

 

Amfosakyi v. Frito Lay, Inc.,

496 Fed. Appx. 218 (3rd Cir. 2012) ……………………………………………....16

 

Apex Colors,Inc. v. Chemwor/d Int'/ Ltd, Inc.,

2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56418 (N.D. Ind.  2017)………………………………...14

 

 

                                                                                                                    Page

Argus Group 1700 v. Steinman,

1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1834 (E.D. Pa. 1997) ……………..………………....21

 

Ball v. A.O. Smith Corp., 451 F.3d 66 

(2nd Cir. 2006) ………………………………….…………….………………...18

 

Boydv v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA.,

 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86675 (E.D. N.Y. 2021) ………………..………....21

 

Braunstein v. Ariz. Dep't of Transp.,

683 F.3d 1177, 1189 (9th Cir. 2012) …………………….………….………...23

 

Brockman v. Friedman,

2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74864 (S.D. Cal. 2023) ………….……...………...20

 

Ensing v. Ensing

2017 Del. Ch. LEXIS 41(C.A. No. 12591- VCS, March 6, 2017)……..……...16

 

Esos Rings v. Prencipe

2021 Cal. Super. LEXIS 120730

(LA County BC652020, November 9, 2021)………………………………….16

 

Ford v. Jurgens

2022 NCBC 9 (NC Superior Ct. February 16, 2022, 20 CVS 4896)………….16

 

Hudson v. Martingale Invs., LLC (In re Hudson),

504 B.R. 569 (BAP 9th Cir. 2014) ……………………………………. ………13

 

In re Case, 937 F.2d 1014 (5th Cir. 1991) ……………………..……………20

 

In re JLJ Inc.,

988 F.2d 1112, 1116 (11th Cir. 1993) ………………………………………….12

 

In re Kennedy, 503 A.2d 1198 (Del. 1985) …………………………………….22

 

In re Shearin, 721 A.2d 157 (Del. 1998) ………………………………………22

 

 

Latman v. Burdette

366 F.3d 774 (9th Cir., 2004) ……………………………………………………13

 

Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. v. Doubletree Partners, L.P.

739 F.3d 848 (5th Cir. 2014) …………………………………………………….13

.

Leidig v. Buzzfeed, Inc.

2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 208756 (D.S. NY 2017) ………………………………..10

 

Marques v. JP Morgan Chase N.A.

2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 233510 (N.D. Ga. 2018) …………………………………...21

 

ML Healthcare Serv., LLC v. Publix Super Markets, Inc.

881 F.3d 1293 (11th Cir.2018)……………………………………………………19

 

Morrison v. Walker

939 F.3d 633 (5th Cir. 2019) ……………………………………………………..22

 

Morrissette-Brown v. Mobile Infirmary Med. Ctr.

506 F.3d 1317, 1319 (11th Cir. 2007) ……………………………………………12

 

Peterson v. BM/ Refractories

124 F3d 1386, 1396 (11th Cir. 1997) …………………………………….....14

 

Sharp v. Klein (In re Klein)

2013 Bankr. LEXIS 5096, 2013 WL 6253819 (C.D. Cal. 2013) ………………...19

 

Shockley v. State, 565 A.2d 1373 (Del. 1989)……………………………………....22

 

Singh v. Hancock Natural Res. Grp., Inc.

2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24893 (E.D. 2017) ………………………………………15

 

Spaine v. Cmty. Contacts, Inc.,

756 F.3d 542 (4th Cir. 2014) ………………………………………………..……15

 

United States v. Musaibli

577 F. Supp. 3d 609 (E.D.Mich. 2021)…………………………………………..16 

 

United States v. Thayer

201 F.3d 214, 224 (3rd Cir. 1999) ……………………………………………….15

 

Statutes

 

2 USC 1927…………………………………………………………13, 14, 20 & 21

 

Other Authorities

 

Bankruptcy Rule 8005……………………………………………………………v

 

District of Columbia Bar Rule 3.3(d)………………………..……………………6

 

Delaware Lawyers' Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 3.3 ….…………………...6

 

 

STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

 

          This appeal under Bankruptcy Rule 8005 addresses the propriety of massive sanctions against the Appellant for arguing that his client did not redact documents relied upon by the Trustee and the Bankruptcy judge to both convert the case to Chapter 7 and to further an adversary case against his clients.

          The standard of review is whether there were clear errors of law or findings not supported by the facts.

 


STATEMENT OF FACTS

1. The Chapter 7 proceedings began with the conversion hearing in March 2022, where the court effectively denied the TSI members counsel.[1] First the court refused to approve their counsel, then failing to grant a routine extension of time for the conversion hearing. 

2.   The black redactions were done on an exhibit that the creditors introduced in the conversion hearing that became the lynchpin of the Chapter 7 conversion opinion (Exhibit 17: a $2.5 million transaction blacked out and blamed on the LLC members by the creditors' counsel): 

“. . . that two and a half million dollar transfer was whited out [actually, blacked out] . . . so that we couldn’t see where the money went . . . We asked counsel for Robinson &Cole to produce these records, they tried, and they withdrew. We don't know where this is. As we sit here today, we don't know what account that is; that has never been produced.”  (Mr. Collins, hearing transcript, March 16, 2022 at 76-77 (D.I. 191).[2]

 

3. The blacked-out document used for the conversion order was done by Ms. Kasen and blamed on the TSI members (D.I. 457, pp. 12-14). “I wanted to let the Court know that I personally did every single black redaction.” (conversion hearing, March 16, 2022, Tr.136) (emphasis added). “And Exhibit 17, which is all the email communications, that was that $2.5 million check and a deposit slip. There are black redactions on there and those were done by me, as well.”  Kasen, Conversion hearing, March 16, 2022, at 136.

          5. Despite her co-counsel’s statement, the creditors continued to misrepresent the facts:

Creditors’ counsel never used the black redactions as part of their argument for bad faith. And, the Court never relied upon the black redactions on the $2.5 million deposit slip and cashier’s check as proof of bad faith.”  D.I. 453 par. 45 (emphasis added).

 

6. The Bankruptcy Court’s conversion opinion plainly relied upon this $2.5 million as its major finding:

“The Court will note that of all the (various) allegations of impropriety the judgment creditors have leveled at the debtor, the one that the Court views as the most substantial involves the claim that the debtor had secretly redacted certain information from the documents it produced….And the judgment creditors make a colorable case that the debtor engaged in precisely this conduct. They point to a check for $ 2.5 million, written from one TSI account to another in July 2019, in which information that one might expect to present that identifies the transferee account is absent.”  In re Team Systems International Inc. 640 B.R. 296, 320 (Del Bankr. 2022) (emphasis added).

 

          7. Judge Goldblatt knew when this opinion was written that Ms. Kasen, the creditors’ counsel, had admitted to doing the very same redaction, prior to the date of his opinion.  

          8. Other documents used in the conversion hearing and the sanctions opinion (supra at p. 4-5) included inadmissible documents thrown out in the Florida litigation but accepted by Judge Goldblatt without any authentication

9. Mr. Moody, for creditors, made this representation to the Court in the conversion hearing on p. 42 (while his co-counsel knew that it was not accurate): “And that swimming pool purchase was characterized in the District Court as a maritime expense relating to the transfer of water.”.[3]  The cited “All Aqua” document along with about one hundred pages of junk was represented to be in “the Florida record.”  Judge Goldblatt erroneously claimed “All Aqua” was claimed as a FEMA expense, based on a false and inadmissible document. 640 B.R. 296 at 312. This error continued in the sanctions opinion.

10.  Mr. Collins told the court this was one of many “fabricated bank records” done by TSI (March 16, 2022 transcript at 70-71).[4] Mr. Turner - Mr. Collins’ co-counsel in Florida – indicated that they did not receive any bank records in the case and that the “All Aqua” document along with others were not authentic copies and not reliable. They were stipulated as inadmissible hearsay and they were stricken from the record [5] (Transcript April 30, 2021, pp.7-8). Judge Goldblatt did not require any evidence authenticating the “Florida records,” which had been ruled and stipulated as inadmissible in Florida. He also ignored these facts when presented to him in the January 2023 hearing (Adv. D.I. 14 p. 22).

11.  The “All Aqua” item was not a business or bank record [6] and is contradicted by all of the legitimate records and relevant testimony.[7] The Court relied upon this item in its conversion order solely upon assurances from counsel that it was admitted in Florida. The actual records reviewed by MCT show that it was accounted for as a K-1 draw to Deborah Mott (D.I. 281, 390).   

12.  When redactions appeared in the case the TSI members protested to the U.S. Trustee via email on February 28, 2022 (D.I. 512-10) and in testimony: “I had the opportunity to review bank statements, and I do not recall seeing any redactions that we produced. I did see the redactions that you guys did on production,” March 9, 2022, transcript, p. 243.

13. On the bogus Florida records, this Court incorrectly states that “judgment creditors …had also obtained copies of the bank statements in discovery in the Florida litigation.” Mem. Op. 6. No bank records were produced in that case (Mr. Turner representing the creditors in Florida stated: “We've never seen the underlying bank documents.” (Transcript April 30, 2021, pp.7-8, ECF 240, D.I. 423, Exh 1 pp.7-8). 

14. On the other redactions, the documents with whiteouts came from the creditors to the Trustee (Hominy declaration at preliminary injunction hearings (D.I. 273), re-introduced at the hearing on the Rule 60(b)(3) motion. Mr. Homony, the Trustee’s accountant, swore that he received copies of the white redacted bank statement pages from the creditors in the January 23, 2023 preliminary injunction hearing. D.I. 273 at p. 5.[8] The creditors also stated the same (D.I. 453-2, par. 7-14).

15. Mr. Homony further testified when he was shown the whited-out transactions that he did not know who did them (January 23, 2023, transcript at p. 38). Mr. Homony subsequently changed his testimony and stated he received the white-out documents directly from TSI members, which is inaccurate. Both he and the creditors already confirmed they provided copies of what they received from Robinson & Cole (D.I. 453-2, par. 7-14). Those documents were the only TSI bank records available to these parties at that time.

16. The sanctions opinion asserts that the bankruptcy court had already found the TSI members did the white redactions on these documents produced by Robinson & Cole (D.I. 256 at 2). Yet nowhere in the record is there any other evidence that they did so, other than Mr. Hominy’s inconsistent testimony (at odds with the facts). The source of the “Confidential” stamp discussed below also contradicts his testimony.[9]

17. As a member of the D.C. bar, Appellant was concerned over the above events under D.C. ethics rules that require a lawyer to report misrepresentations to the court and to the bar [DC Rule 3.3(d)]. 

18.  The Court misleadingly quotes from the bar complaint to try to allege that the whiteouts were the “gist of the [bar] complaint,” Mem. Op. at 12. That is inaccurate. The thrust of the bar complaint was that the blackouts were done by Ms. Kasen. It further stated that the creditors did the whiteouts or knew who did them. That statement - quoted in the opinion - is accurate in that the white-out documents appeared on documents provided by the creditors to the Trustee.

19. The Delaware bar declined to review the matter due to the pendency of the litigation and the matter remained confidential and was not publicized. It added nothing to the proceedings until Ms. Kasen introduced it. Transcript, April 29, 2024).

20. Internal emails from Robinson & Cole were provided to TSI LLC members about the time that they withdrew from the case in late February 2022 (D.I. 512, Exh. 4).[10] Subsequently, they were transmitted directly to the Trustee’s assistant. Judge Goldblatt improperly rejected these emails as evidence, despite their validation by Mr. Acosta (Transcript April 29, 2024). These emails came from their litigation support manager who made disturbing comments about their failure to produce original images of the bank records. On February 21, 2022, the Robinson & Cole IT professional in charge of managing the TSI members’ document production, Jeffrey Hardisty, wrote:

I can provide you with the images used for these docs in the original production (see attached docs with TSI prefix) but they do not represent the original file provided to us. They all show a generic error screen instead of an image of the original document (see other 3 non-Bates numbered docs attached), and I suspect the client feels the docs are corrupt because of the generic error. They are opening correctly; they just never perfectly represented images of the original files provided.” (emphasis added) (D.I. 512, Exhibit 4). Attachment A hereto.

 

21.  Mr. Hardesty noted that “we are producing documents with no metadata” and suggested that they have new Bates numbers. “[w]hat Relativity processed in didn’t accurately represent the source file.” Id.  These new documents were nevertheless produced without notice to the client of any of the problems.

22. In April 2024, Robinson & Cole submitted an affidavit that was designated as an exhibit in the Rule 60(b)(3) hearing and referred to by Judge Goldblatt in his sanctions opinion (Babbit Declaration, D.I. 436-8), although never actually introduced at the hearing. While wrong on virtually every point and contradicted by Robinson & Cole emails, Mr. Babbit noted that “on February 2, 2022, R+C added the word “CONFIDENTIAL” in the lower lefthand corner of each document that it had received from TSI on February 1, 2022.”   (D.I. 436-8). See confirmation by Ms. Kasen (D.I, 453 at 27). This distinguishes documents that were produced by Robinson & Cole to the creditors from the subsequent production by TSI members to the Trustee in July 2022. Contrast Judge Goldblatt’s totally bogus comment of the same item (Mem. Op. at 11, n. 29) (this is completely the opposite of the actual facts on perhaps the most critical error in his opinion).

23. The whiteouts with the word “confidential” inserted clearly originated with Robinson & Cole and were not copies of the original documents, evidenced by both Babbit and the creditors. TSI members did not provide bank statements to the Trustee until July 2022. This is a very material fact totally ignored by both Judge Goldblatt and this Court.

24. The specific bank files that had white-out pages had been scrubbed of metadata, while other source bank records had metadata showing their creation in January 2022 by TSI. This is also evidenced by the Hardesty email indicating that they were producing files with no metadata. (D.I. 512, Exhibit. 4).

25. This was the information on hand when the motion for reconsideration was prepared. At the sanctions hearing, Appellant argued that the redacted documents reflected changes in the originals that had to be authenticated to be used as evidence. Since they could not be authenticated, they could not be used in the case. Yet these documents have been used repeatedly in this case and in a related criminal indictment.

26. Appellant went further at that point and subpoenaed the digital files of Robinson & Cole, both downloaded from TSI LLC and produced to the creditors.

27. Appellant retained Jason Neal Davidson, an extremely experienced IT expert who worked for the U.S. Government on numerous IT projects [11]  (D.I. 512) (“The investigation aims to scrutinize the integrity and authenticity of these documents, determining whether they are accurate reproductions of the originals or have been fabricated”). 

28. Appellant advised the Court of the effort to acquire the digital files and examine their metadata and requested at the sanctions hearing that defendants be allowed to supplement the record (Transcript, April 29, 2024).

MR. MOTT: “I think that we had good faith, certainly the basis to believe that our client didn’t do the whiteouts…. Now we know that the copies that the creditors got were whited out from Robinson & Cole so we subpoenaed all of Robinson & Cole, sourced eight documents they downloaded, and the images they produced. We have an expert that will go through those.” Transcript, April 29, 02024, p. 197-198.

 

29. The creditors had previously also asked for an opportunity to provide additional evidentiary items (Transcript April 29, 2024 at 12-13). The bankruptcy court accepted this and provided two weeks for supplemental authorities or “evidentiary material,” (Id. at 314). Transcript of April 29, 2024, p. 314:

I think that I'm going to give the parties a couple of weeks -- why don't we say two weeks from today -- to submit whatever supplemental or additional material you want to submit. So two weeks from today, you can all write me letters. I'll look at whatever you send me. If there's additional authority, if there are things that you think are evidentiary, what have you, I'll look at it and we'll figure out what -- how to rule on any issues about evidence.”

 

30. The expert report (Attachment B) – submitted within that 14-day period to the court - found:

 

Metadata Abnormalities: Four PDF documents from the May 8th “Source Files”exhibited metadata irregularities: (1)Metadata was missing or not generated for BBVA_2888_2019.pdf; BBVA_2888_2020.pdf, and BBVA_2888_2021.pdf; (2) the data and metadata details for BBVA_8953_2019.pdf were significantly different; (3) the creation date for BBVA_9759_2020.pdf stood out as distinct from the other files.”

 

“The lack of matching metadata or checksums with any original documents

indicates that these are not authentic copies but rather newly generated files. The analysis of the May 8th R/C ‘Source Files’ revealed metadata anomalies and visual content changes, further supporting this conclusion.” D.I. 512  (emphasis added)[12]

 

31. The expert analysis showed that the Robinson & Cole emails were correct that the firm did not produce authentic copies of the original bank statements provided to them.

32. The court’s opinion ignored the expert report altogether as it seriously disrupts the false narrative being pushed in the case. As noted below, it is a critical fact in the allegation of “bad faith” or “frivolous intent.” Someone had or obtained access to the files at Robinson & Cole and altered the documents. For purposes of this appeal, it does not matter who.

33. The Court improperly excluded any consideration of the supplement evidence provided after the hearing, despite specifically providing an additional two weeks to submit additional “evidentiary” material. Even if the Court declined to review the merits of the evidence presented (or provide an opportunity for it to be contested by more than the written submissions that occurred), that evidence proved good faith by counsel to obtain the truth about the source of the whiteouts. This Court previously made the same error and ignored considering the pursuit of metadata as evidence of good faith.

34. The evidence, contrary to this Court’s opinion on the interim order and the Bankruptcy Court’s final opinion, clearly shows that the white-outs came from Robinson |& Cole and that these were not accurate copies of the original documents. Empirical facts have been ignored by both courts: (1) the redacted documents had the “confidential” stamp from Robinson & Cole which was not on the originals; (2) Mr. Homony used the copies from Robinson & Cole in his testimony; (3) the metadata data shows that they were not the original documents; (4) Robinson & Cole’s litigation support department indicated that they did not produce authentic copies of documents.. How both courts can navigate through these facts to still sanction the Appellant is an amazing example of judicial bias.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

 

          The sanctions order and opinion by the Bankruptcy Court are based entirely on an egregiously incorrect analysis of the facts and law. The opinions show a completely biased view of the case, which opts to ignore the use of fraudulent evidence by opposing counsel, while sanctioning Appellant for pointing out this fact. Undisputed facts are either ignored altogether or totally misrepresented in the opinion. The district court cannot accept the bankruptcy court's factual findings if they are clearly erroneous. In re JLJ Inc., 988 F.2d 1112, 1116 (11th Cir. 1993). "A factual finding is clearly erroneous when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." Morrissette-Brown v. Mobile Infirmary Med. Ctr., 506 F.3d 1317, 1319 (11th Cir. 2007) (emphasis added). The use of inadmissible evidence – as done in the sanctions opinion - is clearly reversible error. Latman v. Burdette, 366 F.3d 774 (9th Cir., 2004); Hudson v. Martingale Invs., LLC (In re Hudson), 504 B.R. 569 (BAP 9th Cir. 2014).

Section 1927 sanctions should be employed only in instances evidencing a serious and standard disregard for the orderly process of justice, lest the legitimate zeal of an attorney in representing a client be dampened.“ Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. v. Doubletree Partners, L.P., 739 F.3d 848 (5th Cir. 2014).  

 

The purpose of the sanctions in this instance was to dampen the zeal of counsel who was the only attorney to question the bogus evidence being used by the court to fuel the Trustee’s false narrative. 

The Bankruptcy Court also erred in legal standards applied to sanctions under section 1927. The basis of the sanctions order is the attribution of redactions, both black and white, of financial documents used in the Chapter 7 conversion and subsequent decisions. Appellant was sanctioned for challenging the erroneous attribution of those redactions to his clients, an action solely intended to intimidate and damper his advocacy.

ARGUMENT

I.                  THE BANKRUPTCY COURT ERRED IN FINDING “BAD FAITH” REQUIRED UNDER SECTION 1927.

 

The white-out allegations that the Bankruptcy Court relied upon were actually not in the Motion to Vacate the Preliminary Injunction that was before the court.[13]  The proceedings on April 29, 2024, were on the Motion to Vacate which raised issues on the use of black-out done by creditors’ counsel to allege “bad faith” of the Defendants. Several other issues were in the motion and none of them were frivolous or made in bad faith.

         The test under Section 1927 is a strict one and has been narrowly construed. "[O]bjectionable conduct-even 'unreasonable and  vexatious' conduct-is not sanctionable unless it results in proceedings that would not have been conducted otherwise." Peterson v. BM/ Refractories, 124 F3d 1386, 1396 (11th Cir. 1997). See Apex Colors, Inc. v. Chemwor/d Int'/ Ltd, Inc., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56418 (N.D. Ind. 2017). The hearing on the motion to reconsider would have occurred and been briefed regardless of the withdrawn section of the motion. There was no multiplication of the proceedings, except by opposing counsel.

       In making the sanctions representations on the white-out redactions in the 2024 pleading, Appellant relied upon: (1) the testimony of his clients under oath; (2) the Trustee’s accountant’s and creditors’ counsel’s sworn statement that those records came from the creditors (verified by the “confidential” stamp from Robinson & Colle); (3) the fact that the redactions did not conceal anything and simultaneously production of other documents clearly revealed all of those transactions (disputing any intent or motive by TSI members)[14]; and (4) the Robinson & Cole emails from their litigation support manager indicating that they were not producing authentic copies of the original documents.[15]

       Finally in good faith, the Appellant pursued an expert analysis of the pages with white out to determine if they were in the original files produced by TSI members. Nothing in this conduct indicates any bad faith or any frivolous argument. Nor have any of these facts been objectively considered by either court at this point. It was clearly an error to ignore the most probative evidence on the source of the white-outs which is the “confidential stamp” and the metadata.

In Singh v. Hancock Natural Res. Grp., Inc., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24893 (Case No.: 1:15-cv-01435-LJO-JLT) (February 22, 2017), the court faced key emails that appeared with white-out. To resolve the dispute over whether they were created by the accused party, the court ordered production of the metadata. This allows a determination of whether they were in the originals or in a subsequent produced copy. See Amfosakyi v. Frito Lay, Inc., 496 Fed. Appx. 218 (3rd Cir. 2012) (approving use of metadata to show key letter in the case was not contemporaneous with the event it allegedly described). Metadata in both cases was decisive in their outcome.[16]

          Besides this metadata analysis, the full context contradicts the premise that the TSI members created obvious redactions to hide transactions which they had disclosed in great detail with many pages of documents.[17] Nothing could have been gained by TSI members doing the whiteouts since the redactions only highlighted the transactions.[18] There was no motive to hide the transactions by TSI members since they fully disclosed the transactions and none of them were improper. Judge Goldblatt initially raised the interesting question at the conversion hearing why were the “concealments” inconsistent with the other financial records and tax documents, suggesting impropriety where none existed: “…why isn't what you've put in front of me fully consistent with the document that was produced being a legitimate contemporaneous bank record and the K-1 – or the tax filings.” Transcript. March 16, 2022, pp. 70-71. The redactions and “Florida records” (admitted with no foundation) all imply improprieties that are not factually supported by the undisputed business records, tax filings and other documents produced. See Miller Coffee Tate timesheets on the verification of these items (D.I. 390).[19]  

          The Florida “records” were clearly inadmissible hearsay ruled as such in the Florida case by Judge Hinkle. Yet they were used in the sanctions motion to create a false narrative to smear TSI members and counsel. The sanctions opinion repeats the use of forged documents to discredit TSI members and their counsel. The Bankruptcy Court ignored the fact that the forged $2.5 million transaction came from the creditors’ counsel and sanctioned the Appellant for pointing this out.

          Finally, the facts are clear that the four pages of documents with whiteouts were not properly authenticated as coming from TSI members. The party introducing them was the burden of proving their source and failed to do so. The objection to them were neither “unreasonable” nor “vexatious.” One could argue that attributing them to TSI members is itself a bad faith allegation.

     “…a district court may not properly impose sanctions pursuant to 28 U.S.C.S. § 1927 unless the court finds the conduct to have been both unreasonable and for an improper purpose. Section 1927 requires a sanctioning court to do more than disagree with a party's legal analysis; the court must make a separate determination on both the issue of the reasonableness of the claims and the purpose for which suit was instituted. Before a sanction under § 1927 is appropriate, an offending attorney's multiplication of the proceedings must be both ‘unreasonable’ and ‘vexatious.’Ball v. A.O. Smith Corp., 451 F.3d 66  (2nd Cir. 2006).

 

 

 

II.               THE EVIDENCE THAT WAS FRAUDULENT WAS CORRECTLY CHALLENGED AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN EXCLUDED.

 

On multiple occasions in this case, TSI members have challenged the bogus evidence used to attack their good faith. They denied doing the redactions when they were introduced into evidence. Mr. Gellert objected to the black-outs being attributed to TSI members to the conversion hearing (D.I. 191, p. 125). Mr. Acosta testified that they were not in the original documents produced by TSI, objecting to Mr. Shepacarter on February 28, 2022 to their use in the case. Mr. Mann objected to the Florida documents at the preliminary injunction hearing (D.I. 282 at 22). Judge Goldblatt had the cites to Judge Hinkle’s exclusion of this evidence as hearsay before he wrote his opinion using those documents, just as he knew that the black-outs were not done by TSI members. Once it is clear at any point that the evidence is inadmissible (including in this Court), the court is obligated to act.

   In each case, there was no question that the evidence was not authentic, but the bankruptcy court ignored this fact and relied upon this material. Given the uncontested and apparent fraudulent nature of the evidence, it can be stricken by the court at any time. “[I]t is not error for the court to exclude sua sponte hearsay evidence.” Sharp v. Klein (In re Klein), 2013 Bankr. LEXIS 5096, 2013 WL 6253819 (C.D. Cal. 2013). In ML Healthcare Services, LLC v. Publix Super Markets, Inc., 881 F.3d 1293, 1305 (11th Cir. 2018) (“the evidence … so obviously inadmissible and prejudicial that, despite [the opposing party’s] failure to object, the district court, sua sponte, should have excluded the evidence”). 881 F.3d at 1305.

This point has been studiously avoided by the Trustee and creditors as well as both courts. There are no opposing facts offered on the falsity of the Florida records, the black-outs as not done by TSI members or – for that matter- the metadata proving that TSI originals did not have white-outs. The facts are established by the parties’ stipulation (“Florida records”), direct testimony (blackouts) or the documents themselves (“confidential” stamp and metadata on whiteouts).

 

III.           THE BANKRUPTCY ERRED IN USING EVIDENCE FROM OUTSIDE THE PROCEEDING.

 

Section 1927 is limited to the proceedings themselves and not activities outside of the Court. The language of 28 U.S.C. § 1927 also specifically limits the court's sanction power to an attorney's actions that multiply the proceedings in the case before the court. This means that the statute does not reach conduct that cannot be construed as part of the proceedings before the court issuing the sanctions In re Case, 937 F.2d 1014 (5th Cir. 1991). The statute is strictly construed to ensure that the legitimate zeal of an attorney representing a client is not dampened. Id. This strict interpretation ensures that sanctions are only applied to conduct directly related to the proceedings before the court that is considering the sanctions. See Boydv. Wells Fargo Bank, NA., 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86675 (E.D. N.Y. 2021); Brockman v. Friedman, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74864 (S.D. Cal. 2023).

Judge Goldblat conceded that the pleadings in the case itself were insufficient basis for imposing sanctions: “the Court ultimately concludes that the mere act of signing the memorandum is not itself sufficient evidence of the signers’ subjective bad faith to conclude that the attorneys’ conduct was “vexatious.” (Mem. op. at 11). That should have been the end of his inquiry.

The only predicate for his opinion is created by going outside of the proceedings, which the law precludes him from doing.

"Finally, it must be noted that the language of§ 1927 limits the court's sanctions power to attorney's actions which multiply the proceedings in the case before the court. Section 1927 does not reach conduct that cannot be construed as part of the proceedings before the court issuing the § I 927 sanctions…” Argus Group 1700 v. Steinman, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1834 (E.D. Pa. 1997).

 

The Bankruptcy Court's sanction opinion tries to dodge this limitation by arguing that it can go outside of the proceedings to look for proof of bad faith or intent. This is totally at odds with the overwhelming case law that conduct outside the proceedings cannot be considered at all. Matter of Case, 937 F.2d 1014, 1023 (5th Cir. 1991) ("§ 1927 cannot reach conduct occurring in a separate state court proceeding no matter how vexatious or multiplicious that conduct may be") cited in Marques v. JP Morgan Chase N.A., 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 233510 (N.D. Ga. 2018). See ADP, LLC v. Uniloc USA Inc, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104953 (E.D. Tex. 2020) (emphasis added).

Moreover, nothing in the bar complaint was frivolous or done in bad faith. Mr. Kasen admitted blacking out the $2.5 million transaction and then remained silent when Judge Goldblatt used it to convert the case (the objective she sought). The Delaware Lawyers' Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 3.3 emphasizes that a lawyer must not offer evidence they know to be false and must take remedial measures if false evidence has been presented. Shockley v. State, 565 A.2d 1373 (Del. 1989). Ms. Kasen sat by while her co-counsel used the false evidence in the hearing, itself an ethical violation.  She then failed to correct Judge Goldblatt who –  for whatever reason - used the false evidence as his key point in converting the case.[20] This is certainly not a matter frivolously raised on these undisputed facts.

 

IV.            THE BANKRUPTCY COURT ERRED IN IMPOSING PUNITIVE SANCTIONS UNRELATED TO ANY MULTIPLICATION OF PROCEEDINGS, SOLELY INTENDED TO SILENCE COUNSEL.

 

The total sanctions are over $246,000. This bears absolutely no relationship to any costs incurred in responding to the issue identified by the Bankruptcy Court. The court allowed attorney fees for the response to the entire Rule 60(b)(3). That bears no relationship to the legal premise of the opinion on one issue that was included in the initial filing and then removed. This is excessive as well as unfounded for the above reasons.

This circumstance satisfies the strict legal standard: “An abuse of discretion only occurs where no reasonable person could take the view adopted by the trial court.“ Morrison v. Walker, 939 F.3d 633 (5th Cir. 2019). Here the whiteout allegations in the Rule 60(b)(3) had already been removed shortly after filing.[21] See Braunstein v. Ariz. Dep't of Transp., 683 F.3d 1177, 1189 (9th Cir. 2012). There was no need for a punitive sanction, which appears to solely have been intended to try to compel counsel to abandon the case or otherwise stop effectively prosecuting his clients' interests.

It is also clear from the above facts that the accurate claims of forged evidence and inadmissible evidence that were not vetted at all by the court under the Rules of Evidence and simply ran contrary to an a priori narrative favoring opposing counsel. 

Conclusion

There have been several instances of attorney misconduct in the case involving the deliberate use of forged evidence and fabricated documents.[22] The counsel being sanctioned was not the party guilty of this behavior but was the lawyer who pointed it out.

     The fair and orderly process of justice requires that the sanctions order be reversed.

 

 

Dated: December 27, 2024              

/s/___________________________

RANDY MOTT, ESQ. pro se

Randy Mott, Esq. DC Bar 211037

1627 K St. N.W. Suite 400

Washington, DC 20006

Phone: 202-470-0106 / 703-258-4097

randymott@rmottlaw.com

(Admitted pro hac vice)

 

Attachment A Robinson & Cole emails

Attachment B  Expert Report on Metadata

Attachment C  Actual BBVA transaction form


 

ATTACHMENT A


 

ATTACHMENT B


 

ATTACHMENT C

 

 

 



[1] After declining to be approved as counsel, Robinson & Cole withdrew on February 20, 2022 (D.I. 92) and no counsel entered an appearance until March 8, 2022 (D.I. 112). A request for a 30-day extension by TSI members was denied. Judge Goldblatt allowed the case to proceed while TSI LLC was unrepresented. This included all of the pre-conversion hearing filings by other parties.

[2] Creditors’ counsel actually included the email from TSI counsel transmitting the clean copy of this key document (almost a month before the conversion hearing) in their subsequent pleadings. (D.I.453-6). Virtually everything said by Mr. Collins in this passage is a misrepresentation.

[4] They appear twice in Florida for the most part, once as the exhibits discussed in the exchange with Mr. Turner, but some also appeared earlier as documents placed under seal by Judge Hinkle (ECF 123, 124, and 125).

[5] One document cited often by Mr. Collins in the case was a claim that TSI lied about the size of the total FEMA contract ($27 million vs. $37 million), This document was never authenticated and actually placed under seal by Judge Hinkle but used in the bankruptcy case in violation of that order.

[6]  Attachment C is an actual transaction report from that bank which vastly different than the “All Aqua” and other fake documents.

[7] D. Mott deposition. February 7, 2022, page 145 (accurately describing this transaction).

[8] The same affidavit was used to introduce the white-out redactions in the April 29, 2024 hearing giving rise to these sanctions (documents produced by the creditors to the Trustee).

[9] Ms. Kasen’s sworn declaration indicates that they obtained documents from Robinson & Cole with the “confidential” stamp on them (D.I, 453 at 27).

[10] They were provided to the Trustee much earlier in the case, but the Trustee’s counsel objected to their use, claiming they never received them. See transcript of April 29, 2024. Acosta testimony).

[11] This Court describes him disparagingly as a “purported expert.”  His CV describes his “25 years of experience in computer software design, development, and management” and 19 years of experience including computer security with government security clearance of TSI/SCI.

[12]  The bank reports that had redactions also had scrubbed metadata, while the others reflected the same metadata as the TSI originals. The fact that only the most important bank records had the metadata “scrubbed” at Robinson & Cole suggests spoilation of evidence. Leidig v. Buzzfeed, Inc., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 208756 (D.S.NY 2017). The other document containing a sole $50,000 transfer to Addy Road from account 9759 also has metadata that shows that document was not created at the same time as all the other bank records.

[13] On February 6, 2024, the Defendants withdrew the allegations as to the white-out redactions (D.I. 452) due to the burden of proof required under Rule 60(b)(3),3 while indicating that in a future motion the issue would be raised under a less strenuous burden of proof (Transcript of April 29, 2024, p. 259). The amended motion before the Court on April 29, 2024 did not contain any allegations concerning the white-outs (D.1. 423). Judge Goldblatt erroneously cites the Motion to Strike pleadings which were not subject to any pending sanctions motion. That motion was withdrawn, although it correctly argued the burden of authenticating the white out pages was not met by opposing counsel.

 

[16] Metadata analysis has been the decisive factor in numerous state court cases as well. Ford v. Jurgens, 2022 NCBC 9 (NC Superior Ct. February 16, 2022, 20 CVS 4896) (using metadata to disclose altered email dates); Ensing v. Ensing, 2017 Del. Ch. LEXIS 41(C.A. No. 12591- VCS, March 6, 2017) (various agreements altered and exposed via metadata); Esos Rings v. Prencipe, 2021 Cal. Super. LEXIS 120730 (LA County BC652020, November 9, 2021) (court approved the use of metadata to date versions of disputed agreements). There is an even greater need to authenticate an altered document as evidence of tampering.  See United States v. Musaibli, 577 F. Supp. 3d 609 (E.D.Mich. 2021).

[17]  The $3 million transfer to Addy Road LLC is a subcontract on the FEMA response. The produced documents included a paid invoice and hundreds of pages on the work performed by Addy Road. Obscuring the bank record of this matter would make no sense whatsoever.

[18] Judge Goldblatt’s initial reaction: “So I'm trying to understand, the stuff that was whited out that was sufficiently obvious that it was whited out that you were able to identify it and flag it right away, …the redactions themselves were known to you, but so obviously improper that they should be sanctioned for that, or are you saying that they were trying to trick you? And, if they were trying to trick you, why did they do such a terrible job?Conversion hearing, March 16, 2022, pp. 83-84 (emphasis added).

[19] Very few minor items were not verified by MTC, but LLC members were never asked to explain what documents supported them or provide any other documentation. None of these dealt with any of the redacted items.

[20] The Delaware Supreme Court has consistently held that knowingly presenting false evidence is a serious ethical violation. For instance, in the case of In re Kennedy, 503 A.2d 1198 (Del. 1985), the lawyer was found to have violated ethical rules by knowingly using false evidence in a court proceeding. See In re Shearin, 721 A.2d 157 (Del. 1998), the lawyer was found to have violated multiple rules, including offering falsified evidence, which led to disciplinary actions.

[21] Their removal from the Rule 60 pleadings was prompted by the burden of proof standard and counsel sought to pursue an alternative strategy where the burden of proving their authenticity was on their proponent. With neither the black-outs, whites-outs nor “Florida record” has opposing counsel met this burden.

[22]  The use of these documents knowing that they are inadmissible seems to violate Bankruptcy Rule 9011(b)

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