SUPPLY CHAIN DUE DILIGENCE DIRECTIVE MAY HAVE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES
Randy M. Mott JD
@All rights reserved.
The author has been invovled in waste management and remediation cases for over thirty years in the US, Canada and Europe. He is a graduate of the University of Iowa, a double honors major in politicla science and history, and a graduate of the Georgetown University Law Center. He is currently Director for Euorpe, Africa and the Middle East for CHWMEG Inc. (a nonprofit association devoted to waste stewardship). The views expressed here are his own.
While the pending Supply Chain Due Diligence
Directive from the European Union has been widely discussed by law firms and
environmental consultants and produced many different EU documents, there has
been almost no discussion of its possible unintended consequences. This article
will describe some key concerns from the standpoint of the companies that will
be affected by the Directive. For this discussion we will refer to the last
Parliament’s draft, noting where there may be possible changes as it is finalized
in the negotiations between Parliament, the Commission, and the Council of
Ministers.
The Directive sets out to require companies
with a large turnover within the EU to commit to due diligence of their entire
global supply chain.[1] This will require the
initial mapping of all of their suppliers and vendors, both upstream and
downstream, including indirect relationships (companies where they have no
direct contractual relationship. Once “mapped out,” each business partner
[“vendor”]. will have to be initially assessed in a risk assessment scheme that
examines possible adverse impacts to human rights and the environment. As
discussed below, the yardstick to measure what adverse impacts are relevant has
grown quite significantly since the early European Commission proposal. It also includes very general concepts
from UN and OECD documents, not previously used as legal standards.
Due diligence investigations of these
vendors will be required based on a priority scheme of the possible risks
presented. This effort cannot generally be met without onsite audits[2] followed by periodic
monitoring, including possible follow-up audits.[3] The detailed review
includes all international agreement affecting human rights (child labor,
forced labor, working conditions, gender discrimination and others) and adverse
environmental impacts (in addition to treaties on waste management, ocean pollution,
and others). But the most expansive standard was added in the Parliament to
require conformity with broad normally “soft” standards that do not have
defined parameters.[4]
The first problem in implementation will be
defining what conditions present a sufficient adverse impact to require further
action. This arises because the Directive will require that the company take
remedial measures to eliminate the adverse impact caused by its vendor.[5] Companies are also required to
take measures to prevent adverse impacts in the future.[6] In this fashion, the
Directive will go far beyond simply requiring audits, monitoring, and reporting
of impacts. The obligations growing out of due diligence inquiries raise
the most serious issues and likely problems. Virtually no one has discussed
publicly the very significant financial impact that these requirements will
have on the covered companies.
The current practices of many international
companies include the periodic and continuous monitoring of downstream waste
vendors for example. This is typified by CHWMEG,[7] the organization that does
onsite detailed audits or reviews of waste vendors, including the full range of
waste disposal, treatment, recycling, and interim storage for further actions.
Other organizations also do similar activities.[8] CHWMEG alone has done over
6,500 such audits in over 50 countries for its manufacturing and laboratory
members, now over 311 entities. All reports are produced based on requests from
members in an annual cycle. The reports are considered the most comprehensive
available. Shared costs among the members make this approach feasible.
These comments then are from the perspective
of this experience in actually investigating the environmental, public health,
labor, safety, and financial risks of closure for these diverse types of
facilities. To date, all these activities have been voluntary, but also have
been significantly expanding as more companies establish international programs
for their vendors. From the position of organizations and companies already
actively engaged in such due diligence, there are serious concerns that the
Directive may in some cases reduce due diligence results or provide other major
disincentives for due diligence efforts in the future.
Current audits of third-party waste vendors
are not restricted to their legal compliance (although regulatory issues and
enforcement history are examined). The reports look at general environmental,
health and safety issues beyond mere compliance. The degree to which a company
is willing to continue or form a business relationship with a waste vendor is
its own decision on the risks it will tolerate. While this may lead to the
company advising the vendor on problems it would like to see corrected, there
is no general practice of mandating corrections or improvements. The most
likely approach now is to find alternative vendors with better performance.
So, the current system globally does have
an incentive system enforced by potential legal liability that affects waste
management. This has pushed waste into more carefully designed and operated
facilities. Companies with international audit or review programs have gone
beyond “legal compliance” by the waste vendor since their own liability and
corporate reputation can be adversely affected in major ways. Moreover, legal
compliance with waste laws is not generally a defense for liability for
problems creating by use of those facilities.
New requirements in the Directive to
remediate or prevent adverse impacts seriously raise consequences of using
facility with adverse impacts. This will greatly strengthen the incentive to
avoid use of waste vendors with issues, accelerating the shift of waste to more
proper management and incentivizing business investment in better waste
management technologies (a trend that is already well-established).[2] Waste producers of
hazardous waste now often have policies of avoiding landfills, even if they are
legal under local regulatory schemes. There is also a growing effort to move to
recycling where it is technically feasible. Some of this effort is voluntary in
nature, but it is strongly affected by adverse legal consequences of improper
waste management. The trend is global and generally ignores weak local law
enforcement and similar issues, because virtually everywhere a problem waste
site will cause legal and other problems for the waste producer as soon as it
is publicized or noted by local officials.[3]
So specifically how does the Directive as it
now stands affect the downstream due diligence?
The initial issue with be access to the
facilities to conduct an audit. Current practices maintain confidentiality of
the audit between the facility and customers receiving an audit report. This
assures that reports do not reach competitors of the facility which is critical
to obtaining such access. Problems encountered at the facility can be discussed
between the recipient of the report and the company that ordered it. Legal
non-compliance is flagged with a notice that’s it must be reported to authorities
by the facility. The failure to do so will normally lead to the company
withdrawing as a customer. Even with confidentiality as to distribution of the
audit reports, CHWMEG encounters non-cooperation in a number of cases every
year. In some countries, this is a persistent problem.
The broad public disclosure rules in the
Directive passed by Parliament in particular[4] will alter the nature of
an audit, enormously increasing the tendency of the facility to refuse to
cooperate. This is one more unique feature of the waste management sector in
that most facilities will have numerous customers, often dozens and sometimes
hundreds. Where a large number of its customers are subject to the Directive
requirements, over time the leverage will be irresistible. But outside of
Europe and particularly in developing nations, the number of customers making
these requests (or legally required to do so) will be far fewer. In addition,
our experience is that the resistance of the facility management to onsite
inspections is also be much greater if fewer and smaller customers are making
the requests.
So there will be an inevitable reduction in
facilities cooperation with audits to a greater or lesser degree based on the
situation. The Directive as passed raises the consequences of using a facility
with issues, but it also raises the negative effects on a facility that
cooperates.
The Directive in all versions requires
companies to fund or conduct remediation of adverse impacts. This should be
proportionate to their involvement[5] and in most cases, a waste
generator will be only one of many customers. This quite different that the
relationship generally discussed and assumed by the EU in its deliberations,
which generally assumed a major relationship with the vendor as a serious part
of the supply chain.[6] Particularly upstream
where this is far more likely than in the case of downstream vendors.
So even if access and cooperation were agreed
to, the vendor may be presented with a list of adverse impacts that require
more resources to correct than can be imposed on the small customer who has a
very limited role in causing the problems. Most landfills and incinerators have
dozens of customers. Their commercial business model requires this. A customer
coming to find possible problems and then only required to provide a small part
of the solution will not a welcomed guest. This tendency already exists in
response to audit requests.
This problem will arise both on remediation
and preventive measures. So how does the Directive deal with lack of
cooperation? The lack of cooperation at the threshold of doing due diligence
may make information gathering from the vendor impossible, but the duty to
investigate is not ended:
Article 6(4a): In the event that not all the
necessary information regarding its value chain is available, the company shall
explain the efforts made to obtain the necessary information about its value
chain, the reasons why not all of the necessary information could be obtained,
and its plans to obtain the necessary information in the future.
This poses real
issues since obtaining detailed information can be impossible, difficult or
prohibitively expensive without facility cooperation. This can also distort the
resources to be allocated for due diligence based on risk (a low risk vendor
with a high cost of gathering external information). This issue will be
extremely important to deal with in the EU guidelines.
The Directive recognizes “leverage” will be
different in various types of relationships. Article 5 (2a) lists leverage as
one factor in determining a company’s due diligence policy. Companies should
also “consider using [their] leverage with responsible parties to
enable the remediation of any damage caused by an impact.” Recital 41(a).
The same applies to preventive
measures. However, “the degree of leverage can influence the appropriate
measures” a company chooses to adopt. Frankly, by placing
requirements on companies to take actions involving parties that they do not
control and may not have means of exerting leverage, the Directive will create
many “gray zones.”
Even where facilities cooperate due to
sufficient leverage of customers, the implementation of the preventive or
remedial measures will be under their control. These may be more technically
difficult for them to achieve than conducting their own operations. Our
experience is that most issues discovered in an audit are the result of
problems in the management of the facility. Feeding such operations with more
responsibility to conduct more things out of their competence is a normal
reason to change vendors. See discussion below on “withdrawal.”
Some issues will also strike at their whole
operation, such as slave labor, child labor or the new requirement for a living
wage. These problems along with major environmental, safety or health problems
can raise their costs to customers leading to their closure. The added costs
can make them non-competitive with local firms that do not have these issues,
either because they have avoided the problems or because they ignore them.[7] This will normally
jeopardize their financial viability raising more concerns about “stranded”
waste volumes left on bankrupt or insolvent company’s site.
The current system of liability for the
wastes ultimate proper management allows customers to avoid facilities with
issues that they refuse to correct for any reason. This is often the only
leverage that exists with third parties. Consequently, customers will aggravate
toward facilities that do not have the problems. Mandating that customers stick
with a poorly-run facility will destroy the major leverage that they have to
compel better performance.
The self-selection process has resulted in a
serious upgrading of the quality of waste management in the United States,
Europe, and other markets. Where better facilities are not available, it
creates an incentive for new facilities in that market. Virtually every
properly designed landfill, new incinerator or recycling facility has come into
existence due to this factor.
The problems in this regard become worse
under the Directive’s restrictions on disengagement or withdrawal. In today’s conditions, a problematic waste
vendor will normally be dropped. If they are the only available facility, as in
some emerging economies, the customer may try to offer advice on fixing
problems. Rarely will a customer assume the financial obligation of fixing
major deficiencies. The main deterrent to this is lack of faith in the management,
i.e. a problem usually exists because of a management issue or owner’s attitude
(neither likely to be really changed by a limited technical fix).
However, the Directive provides major
hurdles for a customer trying to drop a facility with problems (adverse
impacts).
“In order to enable
continuous engagement with the value chain business partner instead of
termination of business relations (disengagement) and possibly exacerbating
adverse impacts, this Directive should ensure that disengagement is a
last-resort action.” Recital 32 (emphasis added).
“[D]isengagement
should be avoided where the impact of disengagement would be greater than the
adverse impact the company is seeking to prevent or mitigate…” Id.
The Directive goes on to further restrict
the ability to withdraw from using a problematic vendor:
“Often contractual terms are unilaterally imposed on a
supplier by a buyer, and any breach thereof is likely to result in unilateral
action by the buyer, such as termination or disengagement. Such unilateral
action is not appropriate in the context of due diligence and would probably
itself result in adverse impacts. In cases where the breach of such contractual
provisions gives rise to a potential adverse impact, the company should first
take appropriate measures to prevent or adequately mitigate such impacts,
rather than considering ending or suspending the contract…” Recital34(b).
The Article of the Directive
referred to by these recitals:
Article 7(5)(1): “As regards potential
adverse impacts within the meaning of paragraph 1 that a company caused or
contributed to and that could not be prevented or adequately mitigated, and
where there is no reasonable prospect of change, the company shall be required
to refrain from entering into new or extending existing relations with the
partner in connection with or in the value chain of which the impact has
arisen, and shall, where the law governing their relations so entitles them to,
take the following actions as a last resort, in line with responsible
disengagement…”(emphasis added).
Accordingly, companies now using vendors with problems with be to a
substantial extent locked into those relationships unless they can prove no
mitigation or remedial measures can be implemented, agreed upon or would be
effective (“no reasonable prospect for change”). Creating obstacles to
withdrawal from poor-run facilities actually eliminates the major factor that
currently creates leverage for customers to compel cooperation in audits and to
pressure facilities to improve performance.
This means that
any company evaluating new suppliers/vendors at this point should take due
diligence steps to assure that they do not enter into contracts with facilities
that have existing adverse impacts. Alternatively, they will have to price the
cost of addressing those issues into their projected costs for using that
facility. The provisions also create strong incentives to find and substitute a
better vendor before the effective date of the Directive in national law.
Once these provisions are enacted and
transposed, the result will be a market disincentive for competition to
invest. Moreover, the best complying facilities cannot be used in these
cases and their market share will be reduced. The Directive basically requires
subsidies to the worst performers and penalizes the facilities already meeting
the requirements. In many instances, the Directive may lower the quality of
waste management in this manner.
On another issue, the revised Directive does
not require third-party independent audits per se [Article 14(4a)],[8] but does require an
“in-depth analysis” [Article6(2)(b)], described here:
“Member States shall ensure that, for the
purposes of identifying and assessing adverse impacts based on, where
appropriate, quantitative and qualitative information, including the relevant
disaggregated data that can be reasonably obtained by a company, companies
shall make use of appropriate methods and resources, including public reports,
independent reports and information gathered through the notification and
nonjudicial grievance mechanism provided for in Article 9. Companies shall also
carry out meaningful engagement in accordance with Article 8d with potentially
affected stakeholders including workers and other relevant stakeholders to
gather information on as well as to identify and assess actual or potential
adverse impacts”. Article 6)4).
The Guidelines to be issued before the
effective date on the Directive will hopefully address when an independent
third-party audit is required or advisable. However, the current version places
more burdens on a third-party independent auditor than on an internal auditor.[9] There are multiple
incentives in the Directive for using a third-party independent auditors,
including cost sharing in what the Directive describes as “industry-wide
schemes.” The required public
consultations and disclosures would also make independent audits advisable and
more credible with regulators and the public.
The Directive as amended by Parliament seems
to create a scheme of regulating third-party verifiers or auditors, including those
in “industry-wide” schemes, that can potentially make it infeasible to conduct
those activities:
“Recital 37: The Commission,
in collaboration with Member States, the OECD and
relevant stakeholders, should issue guidance for assessing
the precise scope, alignment with this Directive, and credibility of
industry schemes and multi-stakeholder initiatives. Companies participating in industry or multi-stakeholder
initiatives or using third party verification for aspects of their due
diligence should still be able to be sanctioned or found liable for violations
of this Directive and damage suffered by victims as a result. The minimum
standards for third-party verifiers to be adopted via delegated acts under this
Directive should be developed in close consultation with all relevant
stakeholders and reviewed in light of their appropriateness in accordance with
the objectives of this Directive. Third-party verifiers should be subject to
oversight by the relevant authorities and, where necessary, be subject to
sanctions, in accordance with national and EU legislation.”
None of these restrictions seem to apply to internal
company auditors that would be doing the same activities. Since it is advisable
to encourage independent assessments, the Directive seems to create incentives
that run the wrong way. Cost-sharing of independent audits is a powerful reason
to use collective arrangements, like CHWMEG. But excessive regulations or
requirements could reduce the incentive and alter the cost structure. This
could result in both fewer onsite audits as well as reducing the incentives to
use independent parties.
By extending both the scope of audits and
the number of vendor facilities that would have to be reviewed in a corporate
risk assessment program, the Directive may also incentivize certification
programs that do not involve onsite inspections and any real verification of
self-reported information by the facilities. This would include current ESG
systems that do not score individual facilities but whole companies and do not
involve physical inspection of conditions at any of the company’s facilities.[10] This would seem to be the
“check the box” approach that was condemned in early Commission background
studies. Any certification also involves a “pass or fail” fallacy or a scoring
system that can also be arbitrary. Most of the “adverse impacts” being examined
under the mandatory due diligence standards are not binary. They will involve
local environmental potential “receptors” based on specific conditions at that
location. They will involve degrees of risk and not “pass or fail” conditions.
The Directive as amended by Parliament
contains bold provisions that go beyond merely reporting carbon emissions or
plans to require action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The amendments go
well below simply reporting climate impacts. They require action plans. This
will ostensibly extend to activities in the supply chain outside
countries that have any applicable national climate rules.
“Recital (50) In order to
ensure that this Directive effectively contributes to combating climate change,
companies should in consultation with stakeholders adopt and implement a transition plan in line with the reporting
requirements in Article 19a of Directive (EU) 2022/2464 (CSRD) to ensure
that the business model and strategy of the company are aligned with the objectives of the transition to a
sustainable economy and with the limiting of global warming to 1.5 °C in
line with the Paris Agreement, as well as the objective
of achieving climate neutrality by
2050 as established in Regulation (EU) 2021/1119
(European Climate Law), and the 2030 climate target. The plan should take into account the value chain and include time-bound
targets related to their climate objectives for scope 1, 2 and, where relevant,
3 emissions, including, where appropriate, absolute emission reduction targets
for greenhouse gas including, where relevant, methane emissions, for 2030
and in five-year steps up to 2050 based on conclusive scientific evidence,
except where a company can demonstrate that its operations and value chain do
not cause greenhouse gas emissions and that such emission reduction targets
would therefore not be appropriate. The plans should develop implementing
actions to achieve the company’s climate
targets and be based on conclusive scientific evidence, meaning evidence with independent scientific validation
that is consistent with the limiting of global warming to 1.5°C as defined by
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and taking into account
the recommendations of the European Scientific Advisory Board on Climate Change.”
(emphasis added).
The companies covered by the Directive will
have their own European operations affected by existing European carbon
restrictions and reduction policies. They will also have third-party vendors
within Europe that they do not control. Finally, they will have operations in
countries outside the EU that are not signatories to the Paris Accords or that
have national implementation plans (““Nationally Determined Contributions””) that provide no basis for developing
carbon plans in their sector or are seriously deficient.[11] Where a regulatory scheme is applicable
to operations covered by this Directive, there may be a prospect for a
realistic yardstick of compliance (although there will be few hard bright lines
to determine compliance). Where the operations of a company or business
partner/vendor are not covered by national regulations that set out individual
sector targets, goals or standards efforts to achieve or enforce this
requirement will be problematic.
Conclusion
The Directive is ambitious in its goals and
attempts to change corporate behavior in major ways. However, many provisions
may reduce actual due diligence. The text from Parliament does not seem to
consider the reality of current waste vendor or downstream audits. It assumes
levels of control over vendors that are very atypical in the sector. It will
penalize companies covered by the Directive in situations where most customers
do not have obligations under the Directive. Many criteria for “adverse impacts”
actually have no standards or yardsticks, too often using subjective
terminology from “generic” references. The public participation requirements
applied to the waste sector are very unrealistic, i.e. mandating public
engagement by customers at facilities that they do not control and may not
really strongly influence. Provisions that require commercial relationship to
continue where a facility has a history of problems will have unintended impact
on the market for better managed and designed facilities.
The economic and regulatory consequences of
many provisions will be unpredictable but potentially very far-reaching.
[1]
Some treaties on the use of slave labor, child labor or other non-environmental
issues may still be applicable in those who contract with other businesses that
have these issues.
[2]
“[F]irms actively make contracting decisions based on expected future liability
costs.” Safavi,
“Circuit Splits: Liability Reform and Likelihood of Environmental Risk in the
Hazardous Waste Industry,” March 23, 2022. CHWMEG was created in 1995 out of
concerns over the liability for hazardous waste after the passage of CERCLA (Comprehensive
Environmental Liability and Compensation Act).
[3] The
author did a study using an internet search for “toxic time bomb and waste”
keywords in multiple languages that illustrated these concerns are now near
universal. Once problems are in the media, they attract legal claims and
enforcement efforts.
[4] Several provisions of the Parliament version
have strong provisions: “Article
8d: Carrying out meaningful engagement
with affected stakeholders: 1. Member States shall ensure that companies take
appropriate measures to carry out meaningful engagement with affected
stakeholders that allows for genuine interaction and dialogue in their due
diligence process. To this end, the engagement shall cover information and
consultation of affected stakeholders and shall be comprehensive, structural,
effective, timely and culturally and gender sensitive.”
[5] Article 3(1) (q) provides for measures “proportionate
and commensurate to the
degree of severity and the likelihood of the adverse impact, and proportionate and commensurate to the size, resources, and capacities of the company. This shall take into
account the circumstances of the specific case, including the nature of the adverse impact, characteristics
of the economic sector, the nature of the company’s
specific activities, products and services, the specific
business relationship,” (emphasis added).
[6]
Contract manufacturing seems to be the dominant type of relationship assumed by
the proposed rules. This is where the leverage would be compelling: the
contract manufacture is basically an outsourced part of the company’s own
operations.
[7] Two
landfills operating in the same market could present a case where waste
producers are using one that has issues requiring corrective measures. The
price of the measures will have to be ultimately born by higher prices. The
alternative landfill that was properly constructed can still have a pricing
advantage (fixing problems is more expensive than preventing them). So
ultimately the “repaired” landfill may have to impose higher prices deterring
new customers or those not bound by the Directive “withdrawal” features.
Likewise, customers not bound by the Directive may refuse to pay the higher
prices, creating potential insolvency by the repaired facility. The variables
are too great to predict any particular outcome, but it is clear that
the result may not be better waste management.
[8] “ ‘Independent third-party
verification’ means verification of aspects of the due
diligence of a company or parts of its value chain resulting from
the provisions of this Directive either by
an auditor or an audit firm that is approved in
accordance with Article 3 of Directive 2006/43/EC or accredited in a Member
State for conducting certifications, or by an independent assurance services
provider as defined in Article 2, point (23), of Directive 2006/43/EC accredited
in a Member State in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 765/2008 of the
European Parliament and of the Council for the specific conformity assessment
activity referred to in Article 14(4a) or by an independent third party that is
accredited in a Member State for conducting certifications and which
is independent from the company, free from any conflicts of interests,
has demonstrated experience, expertise and competence in environmental, climate, and human rights matters, and
is accountable for the quality and reliability of the audit or assessment, and meets the minimum standards set out in the
delegated act as described in Article 14(4a).”
[9] Article 3(h) requires EU or national
accreditation of independent auditors. Article 14(4a) provides that the
Commission will set out additional requirements including on transparency. If
this means that audit confidentiality is limited or eliminated, the barriers to
cooperation by facilities will be quite significant.
[10] ESG systems started as an effort to measure a company’s overall impact
on the factors considered as a corporate investment. But it is now being used
to measure a company’s alleged performance across its operations, without
actually looking in any detail at those operations or locations. Tayan,”ESG Ratings: A Compass
without Direction,” Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate
Governance, August 24, 2022. Self-reported data and information from the
corporate level is frequently not even an accurate reflection of the documents
available at that level. Becchetti
and Ciciretti, “Does
Audit Improve the Quality of
ESG
Scores? Evidence from Corporate Misconduct,” May 31, 2020. ESG scores do not evaluate all the required criteria
set out in the due diligence directive and they certainly do not do it for
individual locations and their specific conditions.
[11] “The
United Nations has sounded a warning that governments are not on track to meet
their Paris goals, urging them to adopt much more ambitious decarbonization
plans.” Council on Foreign Relations, September 15, 2023. Is there a
mechanism to compel more effective national plans? “The short answer is that
there is no hard enforcement in the Paris Agreement.” MIT
Climate Portal. Michael Mehling, Deputy Director of the MIT Center for
Energy and Environmental Policy Research, noted the focus is on accurate
reporting. “’Every country has to send periodic reports on what they’re
doing,’ says Mehling, ‘in the form of national emissions inventories and
progress towards achieving their NDCs.’ The main formal consequence for a
member failing to meet its targets is a meeting with a global committee of
neutral researchers. The committee will work with struggling members to create
new plans.” Id.
[1] Basically,
EU-based companies $150 million worldwide and non-EU companies $150 million in
EU.
[2]
Article6(2)(b) requires companies to “carry out in-depth assessments of
prioritised operations, subsidiaries and business relationships in order to
determine the nature and extent of specific actual and potential adverse
impacts.”
[3] Article
10(1): Member States shall ensure that companies continuously verify the
implementation and monitor the adequacy and effectiveness of their actions
taken in accordance with this Directive.
[4] Annex 1, Part 1 (1)(18): The prohibition of
causing any environmental degradation, such as harmful soil change,
water or air pollution, harmful emissions, or excessive water consumption or
other impact on natural resources, that: (a) impairs the natural bases for the
preservation and production of food or (b) denies a person access to safe and
clean drinking water or (c) makes it difficult for a person to access sanitary
facilities or destroys them or (d) harms the health, safety, the normal use of
property or land or the normal conduct of economic activity of a person or (e)
affects ecological integrity, such as deforestation, in accordance with Article 3 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, Article 5 of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights and Article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights,” (emphasis added).
[5] Article
8c: “Remediation of actual adverse impacts.”
[6] Article
7(1): “Member States shall ensure that companies take appropriate
measures to prevent, or where prevention is not possible or not immediately
possible, adequately mitigate potential adverse human rights impacts and
adverse environmental impacts that have been, or should have been,
identified pursuant to Article 6.”
[7] CHWMEG
is a nonprofit association of companies that produce waste and seek to assure
proper waste stewardship by reviews or audits of their vendors. See chwmeg.org.
[9] CHWMEG
maintains a “Global Information
Page” that contains descriptions and links for over a hundred countries
including laws of waste producer liability.
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