Previous Paper on Defeating the Russians ion Eastern Europe: Also the Things Ukraine Did Right

 POLAND’S TERRITORIAL DEFENSE FORCES: A KEY STEP TOWARD DETERRING AGGRESSION

Randy Michael Mott[1]

“The Territorial Defence troops are divided into battalions, independent battalions and brigades which are supposed to conduct defensive and delaying operations in the regions (including urban areas) and directions suitable for the employment of mobile light infantry units. Poland is a geographically diverse country abounding with water obstacles, forests, uplands and foothills which are convenient to organize defensive lines or delay hostile operations.”  Poland’s Territorial Defence Force – Its Role, Significance and Tasks (Kasimir Pulaski Foundation 2017).

 

A properly trained and equipped territorial forces would provide a major obstacle to potential aggressors. The key will be the development of its tactics. equipment and training.

     There are some voices in Poland that question the potential effectiveness of the territorial forces now being recruited and equipped. Can 50,000 troops with limited training and light equipment really add much to Poland’s security? The answer is, of course, they can if properly equipped and trained. History has shown that territorial forces, home guards and militia have played key roles against enemy forces, frequently in asymmetrical situations.  The TDF will create a much greater cost to a potential aggressor that will also buy time and opportunities for conventional defense forces to provide a decisive reaction.

     The Polish Ministry of National Defense has an objective of about 50,000 territorial soldiers divided into approximately 314 companies in seventeen brigades. This basically would provide a company of territorials in every Polish county. The Ministry is seeking innovative training approaches to lower the cost and assure that these troops receive the proper skills. Some innovative approaches to this issue are discussed below.

     While there are clear uses for a territorial forces widely dispersed into Polish communities in non-combat roles such as emergency relief,  the combat role of these forces is the focus of this article. The best analogous situation to study in the recent Russian incursions into the Ukraine and the role of pro-government militia. How effective where these volunteers who organized “on the fly” and faced Russian irregulars as well as organized Russian army units. What lessons can we take from those experiences? How can Poland improve the effectiveness of its own new “militia”?

     The initial incursion into the Crimea and the eastern Ukraine by Russia involved the use of local pro-Russian militia. These groups were recruited out of the large ethnic Russian community in those area. Their infantry training and equipment was minimal in the first stages. But this allowed them to almost “instantly” appear and overcome local police forces in those communities. They occupied important positions and were subsequently supported by cross-border indirect fire. The Russian army also improved the range of its indirect massed fire assets that helped facilitate this role.

     One key role of the TDF will be to combat infiltration by those and other means. Infiltration of enemy liners has always been a stalwart tactic of the Russian army. Without significant ethnic Russian local populations, infiltration in Poland is likely to be conducted by Polish-speaking Russian troops or even recruited Ukrainians.

     The Russian action in the eastern Ukraine included both their use of local pro-Russian separatists militias and finally regular Russian army units, organized as battalion-tactical-groups (BTGs).  The Russians are now expanding these organizational structure by setting up many more BTGs for future conflicts. Several papers have examined the conflict from the inside with similar conclusions: the pro-government  militia was important in stopping the initial Russian separatists forces. Their successes especially supported by regular Ukrainian army units pushed the Russians into overt cross-border military operations. In those latter operations, the militia still performed reasonably well, but lacked some key equipment and training, as detailed below.

     The TDF will provide a good deal of backbone to the local police as well as eyes and ears on the ground. Given the difficulties of the Russian army in the eastern Ukraine when they had to operate in areas without their local irregular support, this is a sound approach with the right Polish TDF training.

     The most alarming lesson of the Ukraine conflict is the dramatic improvement in the Russian army’s capabilities to conduct offensive operations. This included the extensive use of drones and the concentration of a very large amount of massed indirect fire support with an emphasis on improved submunitions.   “The strength of the Russian approach is its ability to deliver rapid massed fires against a typical area target with an intensity and speed of target location heretofore not seen on any battlefield.” Dr. Phillip Karber, Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory & U.S. Army Capabilities Center (ARCIC), “Lessons Learned” from the Russo-­Ukrainian War: Personal Observations July 8. 2015 (Potomac Foundation) p. 14.[2]

 

    Russians went all-out with deadly new tactics and capabilities. In 2014, the Ukrainian Army was the victim of a new development in Russian operations, the use of drones to provide spotting for massed indirect fires using DPICM (Dual--‐Purpose Improved Conventional Munitions)[3],. “For example, at Zelenopillya, in a combined MLRS fire strike that lasted no more than three minutes, two Ukrainian mechanized battalions were virtually wiped out with the combined effects of top-attack munitions and thermo-baric warheads.” Karber, p. 18. This new capability made the use of massed mechanized infantry quite problematic.

     Dispersion was a key to survival in this situation, as detailed below. See CPT Nicholas Fiore, “Defeating the Russian Battalion Tactical Group,” ARMOR magazine, Sepember 2017.  http://www.benning.army.mil/armor/eARMOR/content/issues/2017/Spring/2Fiore17.pdf

     The Russians employed a new formation in the Ukraine, the battalion tactical group. The BTG includes the entire brigade level support units but operates with only one mechanized infantry battalion.[4] While the offensive punch of the new Russian BTGs is considerable, the new approach has major weaknesses. The BTG’s limited infantry capability combined with the problems with conscripted soldiers makes any draw-down of infantry strength a major problem for the Russian field commander. The problem of unreliable conscripts comprising two-thirds of the Russian army is not going away. “even though the BTG represents the best personnel a Russian brigade can deploy, two-thirds of the deployed personnel are unsuitable for close combat, and the third that is combat-ready is too valuable to risk unnecessarily.” Fiore, p. 3.   See Dr. Lester W. Grau and Charles K. Bartles, Military Review, Fort Leavenworth, KS: FMSO, 2016, pp. 20-23.

 

     “Shortages in ready maneuver forces, especially infantry, significantly limit Russian maneuver capabilities. BTGs cannot simultaneously mass for offensive operations and maintain flank and rear security, and they struggle to concentrate artillery against attacks on multiple simultaneous axes.”  Fiore, p. 1.[5]  TDF soldiers can exploit this weakness by forcing a Russian commander to commit infantry to local security operations, diluting the infantry available for offensive missions.

 

    Dispersion and multiple threats along the axis of advance also can overload command and control mechanisms. “Command-and-control (C2) limitations require the BTG commander to concentrate mission-command and intelligence assets to direct-fires and EW shaping efforts and strikes. These assets are employed selectively to substitute for offensive maneuvers, are not available across the entire BTG’s battlespace and can be overloaded by aggressive dispersion and displacement tactics.” Fiore, p. 1. Dispersed TDF forces can provide a defense in depth when supported by regular army units.  This will amplify the weakness in the Russian BTG:

“[A]voiding static deployments of forces[6] that allow the BTG commander to select, prepare and execute limited strikes. BTG capabilities are extremely lethal when concentrated against individual units but diminish rapidly against high-tempo distributed maneuver or defense-in-depth because a BTG can’t resource economy-of-force missions.” Fiore, p. 1.

 

     The Russians, while tactically getting artillery on target in about 15 minutes, rely upon a detailed planning process that is not very adaptable to targets of opportunity: “there seems to be a considerable process measured in hours, even days, in setting up the conditions for the flight route assignment.” Karber, p. 14. This can also be frustrated by dispersed and mobile deployment by opposing forces.

 

     The lack of Russian infantry support in the Ukraine was compensated in part by the use of local irregular separatists forces: a solution that will not be very feasible for operations in Poland. Even late war actions featured key engagements where pro-government volunteer militia proved their effectiveness. “…a defense by Ukrainian volunteer infantry backed up by Army long-range artillery, prevented a Russian success {at Mariupol]. The tactical key to this stalemate lies in the lack of sufficient Russian infantry on this southern direction where unlike in the center and north they have minimal separatist or Mercenary troops available to conduct direct assaults.” Karber, p. 39.

 

     Dispersed militia units also taxed the Russian reliance of massed indirect fire. While particularly lethal for concentrated Ukrainian regular army units, Russian artillery – unless used in a direct fire mode – was less effective engaging multiple small units, especially those under cover. “Dispersion and frequent displacements will decrease the expected effectiveness of an artillery attack.” Fiore, p. 6. Dispersion and movement will also tax the surveillance capabilities of the Russian commander. Id. This may especially true since Russian drones are not linked into a battlefield awareness system, but serve as spotters for dedicated artillery units:

 

“[A] Russian UAS uses narrow-field-of-view (FoV) cameras to recon the battlefield. Dispersed platoons that reposition regularly require more recon missions to maintain contact. Adding to that idea, dispersed and camouflaged units are harder to find. They require more flight hours, UAS to fly at lower altitudes and closer to adversary ground-to-air defense systems. This combination accelerates the BTG assets’ burn rate unless more recon assets can be brought to bear from elsewhere in theater.” Fiore, p. 7.

 

     Dispersion will also be effective in that Russian artillery is based on a mass fire approach and not precision strikes. A dispersed threat will necessitate peeling off maneuver units, weakening the main offensive punch.

 

     The biggest weakness of the Ukrainian militia forces was their lack of suitable antitank weapons.[7] The Russian reactive armor required too many hits from conventional infantry antitank projectiles (RPGs). “The Ukrainian Army reported success using teams of tanks to destroy Russian T-72B3s on several occasions, but multiple hits were required to defeat the tanks’ reactive armor.”  Fiore, p. 4.  (Karber notes that not a single T-90 kill by the Ukrainians has been documented).  See Peter B. Doran, Land Warfare in Europe: Lessons and Recommendations from the War in Ukraine (Center for European Policy Analysis,

November 2016) p. 3.  

 

Conclusions

 

     Several important lessons emerge for the Polish TDF from the Ukrainian conflict. If this lessons are taken to heart, the effectiveness of the TDF will be greatly enhanced and a serious deterrent to Russian military actions in Poland can be created.[8]

 

·         Training must emphasize tactical operations that are “asymmetrical.”  Small TDF units must learn to operate independently and with maximum use of cover, mobility and dispersion. Their mission is not to defeat major Russian formations, but to force deployment of resources that will dilute the combat effectiveness of the local Russian commander. This will provide critical advantages to regular Polish military units engaging the enemy.

 

·         Communications will be important to integrate this small unit actions into a coherent battle plan. This will be difficult in the electronic warfare climate typical of Russian operations, such as in the Ukraine. Multiple technical and practical solutions will need to be developed.

 

·         Antitank capabilities will need to be provided to a significant number of these units. A tandem warhead system to defeat reactive armor will be critical. Karber noted: the “Javelin or TOW II … are the only antidotes to a Russian tank threat protected by ERAA.”  Id. p. 24. A considerable number of TDF tank killer teams can cause enough chaos in the Russian maneuver elements to force early deployment of units that would otherwise be committed to maintaining the offensive momentum of the attack. Survival of the TDF teams will depend on training to disperse, use covered positions, and employ “shoot and scoot” tactics. The stand-off range of the Javelin will also be very helpful.

 

·         Drones (UAV) can provide TDF units will their own tactical intelligence and will greatly increase their battlefield awareness and survivability.  The potential to tie this tactical intelligence into an overall Polish network would be a huge advantage where it is possible.[9]

 

·         Staging areas for local TDF units cannot be fixed or well-known. It would also be advantageous to have them hardened with overhead cover to protect against indirect fires. Multiple assembly points would prudent, but will require training and careful communications.

 

     While these tasks may seem daunting, one has to remember that the Ukrainian militia fought this enemy without advanced training and without key equipment. It is possible to provide mobile training centers to the TDF using the latest American simulation systems to provide localized training in the use of small arms and antitank weapons as well as the current battle field simulation systems to teach small unit tactics. The United States has extensive experience in asymmetrical warfare and can help provide the required training of these TDF units in a cost-effective matter tailored to their distribution in local communities. Bringing the training to the units will be more cost-effective than bringing the units to the training in this case.

 

     The key objective of the territorial defense forces is to create conditions that make a Russian invasion or incursion into Poland a very high risk proposition for Russian decision-makers. Given that the Ukrainians fought them to a stalemate without the numerous advantages the TDF would enjoy, this is a highly feasible objective.[10]  Professor Hubert Krolikoski, senior advisor to the Ministry of National Defense, explained it well:

 

“At the same time, well-trained and equipped territorial formations are capable of carrying out effective retardation measures in the prepared area. Light troops (including territorial units) can also successfully fight in urbanized areas, with proper training and armament. Units of territorial defense, which are intended to saturate the country, can also play a key role in anti-sabotage or anti-missile defenses. However, if a unit of this type defends itself in prepared positions, it can delay the opponent's progress and cause him significant losses.” “Breakthrough in the Territorial Forces Field?” August 31, 2017, www.defence24.pl.

 

 

 

“Żywią i bronią”   Kościuszko Uprising

 

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[1]  Mr. Mott was an infantry officer (U.S. Army R) and is chairman of Republicans in Poland. The views expressed here are solely his own. He resides in Warsaw, Poland.

[2] Mr. Karber made many trips to the Ukraine during the fighting and may be the most experienced Western observer. He was actually wounded in an MLRS attack in June 2015.

 

[3] The United States, while not a signator to the Treaty of Ottawa that banned the use of submunition artillery rounds, nevertheless unilaterally implemented the ban under the Obama Administration in 2014 (after President Clinton had previously refused to sign the treaty). This action should be reversed as soon as possible. The US had a huge developmental advantage in DPICM that allowed minelets, top-attack submunitions, and other specialized rounds that had been specifically developed to stop Russian offensive actions. The United States, unlike our potential opponents, has done extensive work to remove scatter mines and bomblets after hostilities cease. “While Stockpiling Banned Land Mines, U.S. Boasts About Its Record Of Clearing Them,” The Intercept, April 6, 2016 [“the U.S. has been a leader in international efforts to disarm mines”].

 

[4] Dr. Lester W. Grau and Charles K. Bartles, Military Review, Fort Leavenworth, KS: FMSO, 2016. Pages 49-53 discuss the formation of BTGs and analyze mission-command and strategy behind a BTG in-depth

[5] Fiore breaks this down further: “The BTG’s four maneuver companies may not be required for flank and rear security, but they still must provide local and convoy security for the enabling and supporting units. BTGs deploy from garrison with about 200 infantrymen in four maneuver companies. According to Russian Army manuals, in the field as many as 50 percent of infantry soldiers can be required for local security and routine administrative tasks. This leaves relatively few infantrymen available for mounted squads. Squads are usually organized ad hoc and are less than fully manned, which makes them less effective and less independent. For opponents, it also means that it requires fewer casualties to neutralize the Russian squads. Tank and Boyeva Mashina Pekhoty (BMP) (a Russian armored fighting vehicle) availability is less effected, but routine maintenance still reduces the readiness of the BTG’s force of 50 armored combat vehicles.” p. 4.

[6] The author assumes the most effective defense in this situation would be a series of prepared defensive positions. Concealed movement between these positions would create reduced chances of decisive engagement by Russian indirect fire and maneuver units. The TDF will have the advantage of knowing the local terrain and will have time to prepare such a “defense in depth.”

 

[7]  The Carl Gustav ATW will be ineffective against Russian ERA armor. Karber notes that a tandem warhead will be necessary: “Although the Javelin missile is 50% more expensive than TOW II, it  is much easier to train and use. The Ukrainians have repeatedly made requests for the Javelin and attempted to procure TOW II from third--‐party sources. But these systems have been denied by the  U.S. [Obama Administration] out of a fear of “fueling a proxy war.” Id. p, 24. The Polish SPIKE would also meet this requirement with a tandem warhead. A significant number of tank killer teams in the TDF with this equipment would force changes in the Russian battle plan (which is why the Ukrainians argued to get this type of capability from the West).

 

[8]  Many of the same conclusions have been drawn by the Baltic States, including arming the TF will equipment similar to the regular army light infantry. Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW) “The Baltic states’ Territorial Defence Forces in the face of hybrid threats,”  July 5, 2017.

[9]  “[T]he most successful weapon against the drones has been Russian use of a self--‐propelled Electronic

Warfare vehicle with a targetable jammer. It breaks the GPS signal and the UAVs drop out of the sky.

This is how the Russians took down the German supplied OSCE surveillance drones as well as most  of the Ukrainian losses.” Karber, p. 15. “NATO armies should prepare to fight an ECM battle to

keep their drones aloft.” Doran (2017), p. 7. Some authors have suggested a return to analogue devices that do not emit signals that are within the Russian EW array. Phillip Karber and Joshua

Thibeault, “Russia’s New Generation Warfare,” (Potomac Foundation, May 13, 2016).

 

[10] “Together with volunteer battalions, Ukraine’s military ate away at separatist territory, a fitful campaign replete with setbacks, minor defeats, and costly mistakes for Russia.” RAND Corp. “Lessons from Russia’s Operations in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine,” (RAND Corp. Santa Monica, CA 2017) ISBN: 978-0-8330-9606-7.